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Abstract
A market-based scheduling mechanism allocates resources indexed by time to alternative uses based on the bids of
participating agents. Agents are typically interested in multiple time slots of the schedulable resource, with value determined by
the earliest deadline by which they can complete their corresponding tasks. Despite the strong complementarities among slots
induced by such preferences, it is often infeasible to deploy a mechanism that coordinates allocation across all time slots. We
explore the case of separate, simultaneous markets for individual time slots, and the strategic problem it poses for bidding
agents. Investigation of the straightforward bidding policy and its variants indicates that the efficacy of particular strategies
depends critically on preferences and strategies of other agents, and that the strategy space is far too complex to yield to general
game-theoretic analysis. For particular environments, however, it is often possible to derive constrained equilibria through
evolutionary search methods.
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1.1. Strategies for complex market games
Consider a set of agents who have values over a
set of available resources. A unit of a particular
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for at least some resources at zero prices is greater
than the finite supply available. Deciding how to
assign the available resources to agents is an
allocation problem. This characterization of the
problem encompasses many complex planning and
coordinating activities.
Solution methods for allocation problems fre-
quently are developed under the assumption of
centrally available information, or distributed infor-
mation with cooperative behavior. When a centralized
approach is possible, it will in general yield results
superior to any purely decentralized method. Never-
theless, centralized methods are not directly applica-s 39 (2005) 67–85
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held information about the requirements for and
values of possible uses. We cannot rely on the agents
to reliably communicate such information to the
center, as the center’s use of the information to
determine an allocation will typically create incentives
for the agents to misrepresent their situations in order
to obtain more advantageous results.
A resource allocation mechanism defines a struc-
tured communication process that determines which
agents get which resources based on messages
exchanged. The field of mechanism design considers
how to organize such mechanisms taking into account
the information and incentives facing the participating
agents. Typically, carefully designed mechanisms
induce agents to reveal essential information via
monetary transfers tied to the messages and resources
allocated.
Markets comprise a special class of resource
allocation mechanisms in which agents exchange
resources for money, at prices determined through
communication of offers, or bids. When the price-
determination process is mediated, and follows
explicit rules mapping bids into allocations, the
mechanism constitutes an auction.
A set of agents interacting through auctions defines
a market game, with payoffs representing value of
market outcomes, which in turn are a function of joint
bidding strategy. Market games are typically charac-
terized by incomplete information, complex dynam-
ics, and large sets of possible actions (bids and timing
of bids). Market games corresponding to even
moderately complex scenarios are notoriously diffi-
cult to solve. That is, except for the simplest market
mechanisms (e.g., a one-shot auction for a single item,
or a mechanism specially designed to have dominant
strategies), deriving a Bayes–Nash equilibrium is not
analytically tractable.
Strategic complexity presents a particularly difficult
problem when resources may be complements for
some agents. Complementarity manifests when an
agent’s value for a particular resource is greater if it
also obtains one or more other resources. For example,
an airline passenger may wish to obtain two connect-
ing segments to complete a trip. The airline, mean-
while, needs to obtain reservations for both a takeoff
slot and a landing slot for each flight segment. When
an agent must bid for one resource with uncertaintyabout the market resolution of complements, its
decision presents risky tradeoffs.
Given the commonality of market games involving
complementary resources, it is perhaps surprising that
very little is known about optimal strategies for such
games. For example, except under very restrictive
assumptions, we do not know the optimal bidding
strategy in multiple item simultaneous ascending
auctions (discussed below). The explorations reported
here represent our effort to address this large gap in
strategic understanding, in the context of the simple
scheduling domain.
1.2. Market-based scheduling
Our investigations apply to the general problem of
strategy exploration in complex allocation mecha-
nisms. For concreteness, however, we study an
important instance of this class: scheduling problems.
A problem can be described as scheduling when the
resources are distinguished (at least in part) by the
time periods in which they are available, so that a
schedule is an allocation of these resources over time.
Scheduling arises at the core of problems in manu-
facturing, telecommunications, logistics, and many
other common contexts where reserving resources is
called for. It has of course been extremely well
studied, by researchers in operations research, com-
puter science, and artificial intelligence [5,44]. Most
scheduling methods are centralized, in effect requiring
that relevant information be globally available.
A configuration of markets that allocates resour-
ces over time defines a market-based scheduling
mechanism. Computational markets of many kinds
have been proposed for a variety of scheduling
domains, including time-shared computer systems
[37], airport time-slot allocation [32], and railroad
track allocation [4].
We focus on the strategic problem faced by an
agent participating in a market-based scheduling
mechanism. We address scheduling in particular
because it represents an intrinsically important class
of problems, and the temporal pattern of available
resources is often significant in problems beyond
scheduling. Moreover, restricting attention to sched-
uling (indeed, a particularly simple version) helps to
focus our investigation and provides some structure
constraining the problem.
1 For example, complements are patently important in the FCC
spectrum allocation problem, yet separate markets were chosen over
a combinatorial auction despite its high stakes and the authority of a
single entity to set the mechanism.
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When there are strong interdependencies in agent
preferences for distinct goods, mechanism designers
often recommend that the scope of the allocation
mechanisms be extended to consider the resources
together. One increasingly popular class of mecha-
nisms taking this approach is the combinatorial
auction, where agents submit offers for bundles of
goods, and the auction calculates an allocation based
on some global optimization criterion [9].
However, combinatorial auctions are often not
practical, for example, because of the difficulty of
coordinating the allocations of the various resources,
which may have overlapping yet distinct groups of
potentially interested agents. Regardless of the
reason, it is a simple fact that real-world markets
quite typically operate separately and concurrently
despite significant interactions in preferences or
costs. Thus, the problem of dealing with simulta-
neous markets for related goods is a ubiquitous one,
and although it might seem that the problem can be
alleviated in many cases by widening the scope of
the market, this is not a universally applicable
solution.
Note that, in some cases, allocating multiple
resources through simultaneous auctions is a deliber-
ate design choice, for example (until quite recently),
in the series of FCC spectrum auctions [21]. In some,
it is a result of separate initiation of commonly
operated auctions (e.g., all of the auctions running
concurrently—despite potential interactions—on
eBay), and in many others, a result of completely
separate initiation and operation of markets.
Although most of the literature on auction theory
deals with mechanisms mediating a single resource
[17], some recent work has addressed the issues of
simultaneous auctions for multiple goods. The main
lesson seems to be that simultaneous ascending
auctions tend to work well when there exists a
competitive price equilibrium. A sufficient condition
for competitive equilibrium is that goods are sub-
stitutes [15,3]. This is not altogether surprising given
that substitutability is the standard condition for
stability of the tatonnement protocol [20]. It is also
well-established that simultaneous ascending auctions
can fail miserably whenever there are any comple-
ments [24,13].Simultaneous auctions are quite common even
when the gross substitutes condition does not hold.1
Thus, an understanding of how agents should behave
when faced with separate markets for complements
would constitute useful knowledge for strategists as
well as mechanism designers.2. Scheduling problem definition
In the simple scheduling problem, we consider
[43], there are M units (called time slots) of a single
schedulable resource, indexed 1,. . .,M. Each of N
agents has a single job that can be accomplished using
the resource. Agent j’s job requires kj time slots to
complete, and by accomplishing this job, it obtains
some value depending on the time it completes.
Specifically, if j acquires kj time slots by deadline t, it
accrues value vj(t). Deadline values are nonincreas-
ing: tbt V implies vj(t)zvj(t V).
If kj=1 for all j, we call the scheduling problem
single unit. Problems violating this constraint are
multiple unit. If each agent j has a single deadline
[there exists a Tj such that vj(t)=vj(t V)N0 for all t,
t VVTj, and vj(tU)=0 for all TjbtUVM], we call the
problem fixed deadline. If vj(t)Nvj(t V)N0 for some j, t,
t’ (i.e., j accrues greater value for finishing the job
sooner), then we call the problem variable deadline.3. Ascending auctions
3.1. Mechanism
In the simultaneous ascending auction for sched-
uling, a separate auction is run for each slot. Each
auction can have multiple rounds of bidding. At any
given time, the bid price on slot m is bm, defined to be
the highest bid bj
m made thus far (or zero if there have
been no bids). The ask price for slot m is defined to be
am=bm+e. To be admissible, a bid must satisfy
bj
mzam. If an auction receives multiple admissible
Table 1
A simple problem illustrating the pitfalls of SB (Example 1)
Name Job length Deadline Value
Agent 1 1 2 5
Agent 2 2 2 8
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ties arbitrarily). An auction is quiescent when a round
passes with no new admissible bids.
The auctions proceed concurrently. When all of
them are simultaneously quiescent, the auctions all
close and allocate their respective slots per the last
admitted bids. Because no slot is committed until they
all are, an agent’s bidding strategy on one slot cannot
be contingent on the outcome for another slot.
3.2. Straightforward bidding
In order to analyze the overall market protocol, we
evaluate how the simultaneous auction mechanism
performs when agents pursue particular strategies. We
begin with a baseline strategy called straightforward
bidding (SB).2 A straightforward bidder takes a vector
of perceived prices for the slots as given, and bids
those prices for the bundle of slots that would
maximize the agent’s surplus if it were to win all of
its bids at those prices.
If agent j is assigned a set of slots X, it accrues
value vj(X) based on the best deadline it can achieve:
vj(X)=vj(X(kj)), where X(t). is the tth time slot in X.
Given that it obtains X at prices pY, the agent’s surplus
is its value less the amount paid, r X ; pYð Þ ¼ vj Xð Þ P
maX pm . When agent j is winning the set of slots
X1 in the previous bidding round, we define the
current perceived prices to be p̂m=bm for maX1, and
p̂m=am otherwise. Then, under SB, agent j bids
bj
m=p̂m for maX*, such that X* ¼ argmaxXr X ; p̂Y
 
.
3.3. Baseline strategy performance
The straightforward bidding strategy is quite
simple, involving no anticipation of other agents’
strategies. For the single-unit problem, such antici-
pation is unnecessary, as the agent would not wish to
change its bid even after observing what the other
agents did [3]. This is called the no regret property
[14], and means that from the agent’s perspective, no
bidding policy would have been a better response to
the other agents’ bids.2 We adopt the terminology introduced by Milgrom [24]. The
same strategy concept is also referred to as bmyopic best responseQ,
or bmyopically optimalQ, or even bmyoptimalQ [16].A single-unit, fixed-deadline problem in which all
agents have the same deadline (M without loss of
generality), is equivalent to a problem in which all
buyers have an inelastic demand for a single unit of a
homogeneous commodity. For this problem, Peters
and Severinov [28] showed that straightforward
bidding is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Up to a
discretization error, the allocations from simultaneous
ascending bid auctions are efficient when agents
follow straightforward bidding. We have shown else-
where [43] that the final price vector will differ from
the minimum unique equilibrium price by at most ej,
where jumin(M,N). The value of the allocation,
defined to be the sum of the bidder surpluses, will
differ from the optimal by at most je(1+j). A similar
bound was established by Bertsekas [2] in a more
general setting.
Unfortunately, the very nice properties for straight-
forward bidding in single-unit problems do not carry
over to multiple-unit problems. Indeed, the resulting
price vector can differ from the minimum equilibrium
price vector, and the allocation value can differ from
the optimal, by arbitrarily large amounts [43].
Example 1. There are two agents, with values as
shown in Table 1. The bid increment is e=1.3
One admissible straightforward bidding path leads
to a state in which agent 2 is winning both slots at
prices (4,3). Then, in the next round, agent 1 would
bid b1
2=4. The auction would end at this point, with
agent 1 receiving slot 2 and agent 2 receiving slot 1,
both at a price of 4.
In this example, SB leads to a result with value 5,
whereas the optimal allocation would produce a value
of 8. Adding slots and agents would enable construct-
ing slightly more complex examples, magnifying the
suboptimality to an arbitrary degree.3 We adopt this unit bid increment and specify integer values
for achieving jobs in all subsequent examples as well.
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We have seen that straightforward bidding fails to
guarantee high-quality allocations except in highly
restricted problems. It is also quite easy to show that
straightforward bidding is not an equilibrium strategy
in general.
Consider again Example 1. With SB agents, the
mechanism reached quiescence at prices (4,3). How-
ever, it is not rational for agent 2 to stop at this point.
If, for example, it offered b2
2=5, the auction would end
(assuming agent 1 is a straightforward bidder), and
agent 2 would be better off, with a surplus of 1
rather than 4.
It is clear that SB is not a reasonable candidate for
a general strategy in the simultaneous ascending
auction for simple scheduling.
4.1. Equilibrium strategies in the scheduling game
Finding equilibrium strategies for even the rela-
tively simple scheduling problem we have defined is a
daunting task. First, the strategy space is enormous.
An agent’s preferences are described by a job length
plus a potentially different value for each of M
deadlines. Therefore, the space of joint preferences
is (M+1)N dimensional. The state information that
agents have consists of the price-quote history. When
the bid increment e is small relative to the range of
agent valuations, the number of bidding rounds can be
quite large. Each round will generate an M-vector of
current bid prices
Yb. The strategy space is all
functions mapping the Cartesian product of the space
of preferences and the space of all price-quote
histories into a vector of next-round bids. Finding
an optimal strategy by enumeration will be computa-
tionally infeasible for any nontrivial problem instance
in this class.
We might hope that thoughtful reflection on the
structure of the scheduling problem might lead us to a
workable set of plausible strategies, within which the
search for an optimal strategy would be manageable.
However, our first example above rules out SB as a
candidate, and even a small amount of further
exploration reveals that best-response behavior in
simple examples is highly sensitive to the realizations
of agent preferences, and to the strategies of other
agents.A desirable approach to search for optimal strat-
egies is to analytically derive them from the optimality
criterion and certain axiomatic restrictions on ration-
ality. Unfortunately, optimal strategies are rarely found
for problems of even moderate complexity, such as
ours. At least one difficulty in interesting schedule
problems that we believe makes analytic derivation of
optimal strategies extremely difficult is the presence of
complementarities in preferences: that is, the value to
an agent for a given slot typically depends on whether
or not the agent acquires one or more other slots. This
presents the agent with the so-called exposure prob-
lem, where, in order to obtain the combination it
prefers, it must expose itself to the risk it will get
caught paying for a far less desirable (in our schedul-
ing problem, completely worthless) subset. Managing
such exposure presents a complex risk assessment and
decision problem, and we have as yet seen no evidence
that a general solution is forthcoming.
Rather than restrict our analyses of scheduling
mechanisms to their performance when agents imple-
ment ad hoc bidding strategies we know are arbitrarily
far from optimal, we propose a method for directed
search to find improved strategies. The idea is not
complicated. In our work to date, we select a set of
candidate strategies, and then evaluate their perform-
ance against each other through a statistical simulation
based on an evolutionary game. Strategies are
assigned population frequencies, and samples of
agents compete against each other. Strategies that
perform relatively well are rewarded with higher
population frequencies. Thus, through what amounts
to a structured Monte Carlo simulation, poor strategies
are weeded out.
We describe our evolutionary game tool in greater
detail in Section 5. First, we illustrate our specification
of the strategy space with a concrete example.
4.2. Variant strategy: bsunk awarenessQ
We showed in Example 1 that in some problems,
agents following a straightforward bidding strategy
may stop bidding prematurely. A bit of reflection
indicates why straightforward bidding is failing in this
situation. In a given round, agents bid on the set of
slots that, at the current ask prices, will maximize their
surplus. If no configuration of slots would yield
positive net surplus, the agent chooses not to bid,
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However, this behavior ignores outstanding commit-
ments: the agent may already be winning on one or
more slots. If the agent drops out of the bidding, and
others do not bid away the slots the agent already is
winning, then its alternative surplus is not zero, but
negative the sum of bid prices for the slots the agent
wins. Thus, this failure of straightforward bidding is
due to ignoring the true opportunity cost of not
bidding.
We refer to this property of straightforward bidding
as bsunk unawarenessQ. Agents are bidding as if the
incremental cost for slots they are currently winning is
the full price. However, because they are already
committed to purchasing these slots (if another agent
does not raise the bid price), the cost is sunk, and the
incremental cost is zero.
Given this clear failure of straightforward bidding,
we have parameterized a family of strategies to permit
agents to account to a greater or lesser extent for the
true incremental cost for slots they are currently
winning. We call this strategy bsunk awareQ. A sunk-
aware agent bids as if the incremental cost for slots
currently winning is somewhere on the interval of
zero and the current bid price. In Section 6, we report
on our experiments to discover the optimal setting of
the sunk-awareness parameter.
We now formalize the sunk-aware strategy family.
Define agent j’s perceived price for slot m to be kbm if
the agent j is currently winning slot m, and bm+e
otherwise. The sunk-awareness parameter is ka[0,1].
If k=1, the strategy is identical to straightforward
bidding. At k=0, the agent is fully sunk aware,
bidding as if it would retain the slots currently
winning with certainty. Intermediate values are con-
sistent with bidding as if the agent puts an inter-
mediate probability on the likelihood of retaining the
slots it is currently winning.
The sunk-awareness parameter is a reactive adap-
tation to a complex tradeoff: the agent’s bidding
behavior changes after it finds itself exposed to the
underlying problem (owning slots it may not be able
to use). An alternative is predictive adaptation: the
agent uses a model of the underlying problem to
anticipate possible exposure, and adapts its bidding
behavior for the anticipated risk. For example, the
agent might model the probability of winning various
slots, or expectations about the eventual prices.Entrants in a series of trading agent competitions
explored a variety of bidding strategies that rely on
explicit price predictions [12,36,42]. We have started
to investigate price prediction strategies using our
methodology [19]. The predictive approaches of
which we are aware require more specific knowledge
and more parameters, but offer some compensating
advantages.5. Searching for restricted equilibria
We explore bidding strategies for our scheduling
market by searching within a small set of candidate
strategies for a Nash equilibrium (with respect to ex
ante expected payoffs), then extending the search to
new strategy sets. To do this, we first convert our
game from extensive to strategic form, by using
Monte Carlo simulation to generate an expected
payoff matrix for every combination of the strategies
playing against each other. Given the expected payoff
matrix, we find Nash equilibria (NE) with one of three
methods: replicator dynamics (an evolutionary tourna-
ment), GAMBIT (a computational game solver), or
Amoeba (a function minimization search algorithm).
In the remainder of this section, we describe each of
these tasks.
5.1. Generating payoff matrices
We have implemented a simulator for the mecha-
nism described in Section 2. We estimate the payoff
matrix for a restricted game, in which agents are
permitted to play only strategies drawn from a
restricted set.
An instance of the restricted game is defined by
! the auction rules (e.g., simultaneous ascending bid;
minimum bid increment e),
! a number of slots M,
! a number of participating agents N,
! the distribution of agent preferences, and
! a finite set S of strategies permitted to agents.
Each strategy is a function that maps agent
preferences plus available auction information to a
set of bids. For our simulations, we construct agents
implementing selected strategies. We calculate the
D.M. Reeves et al. / Decision Support Systems 39 (2005) 67–85 73expected payoffs with respect to specified distribu-
tions from which agent preferences are drawn. See
Section 6 for specifics on the preference distributions.
As discussed in Section 4.1, the space of strategies
is enormous. In the present work, we explore a very
restricted region of this space. First, we consider only
reflex agents: they consider only information from the
current auction round (prices and which slots the
agent is winning), not from previous rounds. We
further consider only a specific parameterized family
of strategy functions defined on this restricted space
of preferences and information. Our family of strategy
functions is based on SB, generalized in six dimen-
sions: sunk awareness, price monotonicity belief,
price time bias, reluctance, price aggressiveness, and
slot aggressiveness. For the explorations reported in
this paper, we vary only the sunk-awareness param-
eter (k).
With the game parameters and agent strategies
specified, we compute the expected payoff matrix. An
element in the matrix is an N-vector of expected
payoffs associated with a particular strategy profile. A
strategy profile for an N-player game is a list of the
specific strategies that each player follows. For
example, in a five-player game in which two players
play with sunk awareness k=0.5 and the others play
k=1, the profile is {0.5, 0.5, 1, 1, 1}. There is a
distinct element in the payoff matrix for each of the
N þ jSj  1
N

possible strategy profile combinations,
where |S| is the number of permissible strategies.
To estimate an entry of the expected payoff matrix,
our Monte Carlo simulator repeatedly draws prefer-
ences and assigns them to agents, simulates the
auction protocol for the given strategy profile to
quiescence, and averages the resulting surpluses. Note
that this means that the values used in the payoff
matrix are only estimates. In related work, Walsh et al.
[40] show how to interleave the Monte Carlo
simulation with the Nash equilibrium computation to
concentrate sampling on profiles for which more
accurate payoff estimates will yield better estimates of
the Nash equilibria of the underlying game, allowing
substantial reduction in the number of simulations
needed to estimate a payoff matrix. In this work, we
apply naive uniform sampling of the strategy profiles.
In Section 7, we consider the problem of determining
how sensitive the derived equilibria are on the sample
sizes used to estimate the payoff matrices.5.2. Evolutionary search for equilibria
In his original exposition of the concept, Nash [25]
suggested an evolutionary interpretation of the Nash
equilibrium. We use the replicator dynamics formal-
ism, introduced by Taylor and Jonker [38] and
Schuster and Sigmund [35]. If the probabilities in a
mixed strategy are cast as proportions of a large
population of agents playing the corresponding pure
strategies, then an agent population that has reached a
fixed point with respect to the replicator dynamics
will be a candidate symmetric mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium. Weibull [41] shows that for two-player,
two-strategy games, fixed points of a broad class of
replicator processes are Nash equilibria if neither
strategy is extinct. For N-player games, the set of
fixed points that are locally asymptotically stable (all
states sufficiently close converge to the same state) are
a subset of the set of Nash equilibria (NE) [10]. A
fixed point (i.e., a stationary state) is a population in
which every pure strategy with more than zero
representatives in the population does as well in
expectation against N1 strategies drawn randomly
from the population as N strategies drawn randomly
from the population do against each other. In other
words, every pure strategy is doing as well as every
other, given the population proportions.
This definition suggests an iterative (evolutionary)
algorithm for finding an equilibrium in NE. We
choose an initial population proportion for each pure
strategy in the permissible set, and then update them
in successive generations so that strategies that
perform well increase in the population at the expense
of low-performing strategies. The proportion pg(s) of
the population playing strategy s in generation g is
given by
pg sð Þ~pg1 sð Þ EPs Wð Þ;
where EPs is the expected payoff for pure strategy s
against N1 players all playing mixed strategies
according to the population proportions, and W is a
lower bound on payoffs (e.g., the minimum value in
the payoff matrix) which serves as a dampening
factor. To calculate the expected payoff EPs from the
payoff matrix, we average the payoffs for s in the
profiles in which it appears, weighted by the
probabilities of those profiles. The probability of a
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of players playing strategy s, is
N !
n1! . . . nASA!
p 1ð Þn1: : :p jSjð ÞnjSj :
(This is the multinomial coefficient multiplied by the
probability of a profile if order mattered.)
If the population update process reaches a fixed
point, then the final population proportions are a
candidate mixed strategy equilibrium. We verify
directly that the candidate is indeed a static Nash
equilibrium by checking that the evolved strategy is a
best response to itself.4 In all the experiments reported
here, this process indeed reaches a fixed point and
these fixed points always correspond to Nash equi-
libria. However, we have found examples for which
the replicator dynamics do not converge and the
population proportions cycle.
5.3. Solving payoff matrices with GAMBIT
GAMBIT [23] is a tool for solving finite games. It
takes the full matrix representation of a strategic form
game and proceeds by iteratively eliminating strongly
dominated strategies and then applying the simplicial
subdivision algorithm [22] to enumerate all Nash
equilibria.
The problem with using GAMBIT in its current
implementation is that it cannot take advantage of
symmetry in a payoff matrix. This means that the
matrix will consist of |S|N cells.5 The other approaches
described in this section take advantage of a sparse
representation of the payoff matrix that exploits the4 Friedman [10] has shown in a fairly general setting that a
dynamically stable equilibrium of the evolutionary game is also a
Nash equilibrium of the static game. However, we cannot strictly
rely on this result. First, our numerical results at best identify an
approximate fixed point, with a finite error tolerance (typically
1010). Second, a fixed point is only a necessary condition for a
Nash equilibrium; sufficiency requires verifying that the fixed point
is Lyapunov stable. There is also a regularity condition for
Friedman’s results—that the dynamics are continuous, not discrete
in time—that we do not satisfy (although Friedman conjectures that
the generalization holds).
5 This computational burden is not trivial. For example, in
many experiments we have run on five-player/five-strategy games,
GAMBIT took hours or sometimes days to find all the Nash
equilibria when it could find them at all.symmetry and requires only





example, with N=|S|=5, symmetry reduces the number
of distinct profiles to 126, versus 3125 for the full
matrix representation.
5.4. Searching for equilibria with Amoeba
One of the many characterizations of a (symmetric)
Nash equilibrium is as a global minimum of the
following function from mixed strategies to the reals:
f pð Þ ¼
X
saS
max 0; u s; pð Þ  u p; pð Þ½ 	2;
where u(x, p) is the payoff from playing strategy x
against everyone else playing strategy p. The function
f is bounded below by zero and in fact for any
paNE, f( p) is zero. This is because f( p) is positive if
any pure strategy is a strictly better response than p
itself.
We can search for the root of f using the Amoeba
algorithm [30], a procedure for nonlinear function
minimization based on the Nelder–Mead method [26].
For our experiments, we use an adaptation of Amoeba
developed by Walsh et al. [39].
5.5. Replicator dynamics and biased sampling
Based on the observation that estimating the cells
of the payoff matrix is far more compute-intensive
than finding equilibria, we have explored another use
for our evolutionary game simulator: as a biased-
sample approach to generating the expected payoff
matrix. For this method, we do not calculate the
payoff matrix first, then search for equilibria; rather,
we tackle the two simultaneously. We start with an
initial set of population proportions for each pure
strategy. Then, as before, we repeatedly sample from
the preference distribution, iterating our auction
mechanism to quiescence. However, now, strategies
are randomly drawn to participate according to their
population proportions. Then, after a relatively small
number of samples—long before we have confidence
that they are precise estimates of the expected
payoffs—we apply the replicator dynamics using the
realized average payoffs. Then, given the new
population proportions, we iterate, calculating a
sequence of new generations, except that for each
generation we retain the accumulated estimate of
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calculate a correctly weighted average of the old and
new sample information. The iteration of generations
continues until the population proportions are sta-
tionary with respect to the replicator dynamics.
The above procedure straightforwardly accumu-
lates a statistically precise estimate of the expected
payoff matrix. However, the sampling is biased:
strategies that are more successful (and thus more
highly represented in the population) are sampled
more often. We conjecture that this approach would
be more efficient than uniform sampling, especially
for problems with a large number of permissible
strategies. Because many of them will likely not be
present in a Nash equilibrium—that is, their popula-
tion fractions will converge to zero—extensive
sampling to lower the standard error of the estimated
payoff would be wasteful. However, we have found it
easier to study the dynamics of our experiments when
the full payoff matrix is calculated to high precision
before the replicator dynamics are applied, and for the
relatively small problems we simulate here the
computational cost has been manageable.6. Experiments in sunk awareness
We have begun our search in strategy space with a
systematic exploration of bidding strategies that vary
on the sunk-awareness parameter (k). We consider
parameter settings in multiples of 1/20 from 0 to 1.
For simplicity of reference, we designate strategies
by an integer from 0 to 20, such that strategy i
refers to the baseline agent with k=i/20. For all of
these experiments, we used the following game
parameters:
! number of slots M=5,
! number of agents N=5 (except in Section 6.4),
! bid increment e =1.
We varied the distributions from which preferences
are drawn. The primary structural distinction we have
explored is with respect to the distributions of job
lengths, k. In the uniform model, job length is
~U[1,M], that is, Pr(k=l)=1/M, la{1,. . .,M}. In the
constant model, kj is fixed at a particular value for all
j (in all of the trials we report, kj=2). Finally, in theexponential model, we draw job length from an
exponential distribution. Specifically,
Pr k ¼ lð Þ ¼ 2
l l ¼ 1; . . . ;M  1
2Mþ1 l ¼ M :

In all three of these models, the deadline values for
each slot are initialized as integers ~U[1,50], but then
modified to ensure monotonicity (since the game is
only defined for monotone preferences):
v tð Þpv min iztjv ið ÞVv t  1ð Þf gð Þ or 0;
t ¼ k þ 1;: : :;M :
In words, iterate through the deadline values and
whenever one violates monotonicity (i.e., exceeds its
predecessor) set it to the earliest later deadline value
that restores monotonicity (i.e., is less than or equal to
its predecessor).
Finally, in Section 6.4, we explore games with
varying number of agents (players) within the
exponential preference model.
6.1. Uniform job length
In Fig. 1, we offer a representation of the payoff
matrix for the restricted game with strategies 18, 19,
20, and uniformly distributed job length. To illustrate,
the first column represents the payoffs for the strategy
profile {18,18,18,18,18}. Each strategy in this profile
receives the same payoff (since each agent is playing
the same strategy and the game is symmetric) of about
1.12. The second column presents the payoffs for
{18,18,18,18,19}. When playing against one k=19/20
agent, the other four k=18/20 agents now do better
than in the all-18 profile, and very slightly better than
the sole k=19/20 agent does in this profile. When one
agent deviates from 18 to 20 (third column), it does
noticeably better and so do the agents playing 18.
In Fig. 2, we show the result of running the payoff
matrix through the replicator dynamics. The popula-
tion evolves to all playing 20 (k=1). This is in fact a
Nash equilibrium as can be seen by noting that the all-
20 profile in the payoff matrix (Fig. 1) scores higher
than any unilateral deviation. In this restricted game,
20 is a dominant strategy (this can be verified, albeit
tediously, by inspecting the payoff matrix), and hence
the only Nash equilibrium.
Fig. 1. Payoff matrix for strategies 18,19,20 with uniform preferences. Each column corresponds to a strategy profile: {18,18,18,18,18} through
{20,20,20,20,20} in lexicographic order. The jth dot within a column represents the mean payoff for the jth strategy in the profile. This payoff
matrix is based on over 45 million games simulated for each of the 21 profiles, requiring weeks of cpu time. The error bars denote 95%
confidence intervals.
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and Amoeba. We also find that the replicator
dynamics converges to the unique Nash equilibrium
from various initial population proportions (for
example, see Fig. 3). Note that the strategy k=1
corresponds to straightforward bidding (no sunk
awareness).Fig. 2. First 14 generations of replicator dynamics for strategies
20ka{18,19,20} in a game with uniform preferences. Strategy 20
quickly takes over the population, hence the evolved equilibrium is
(0,0,1) meaning everyone plays 20 (i.e., k=1).6.2. Constant job length
It is not the case that k=1 is always a dominant
strategy. This follows immediately from the discus-
sion above (Section 4) for the unrestricted game. Even
when we restrict strategies to straightforward bidding
extended only by the sunk-awareness parameter (k),
we can find environments in which k=1 does not
dominate.
In our experiments with constant job length, we fix
kj=2 for all j, and we consider a slightly larger set of
strategies. In our first run, we consider strategies 16, 17,
18, 19, and 20. We present the evolutionary dynamics
for our estimate of the expected payoff matrix in Fig. 4.
The payoff matrix required 22 million game simu-
lations for each of the 126 strategy profiles. When run
through our replicator dynamics, the system evolves to
{0.745,0.255,0,0,0} which constitutes a mixed strategy
Nash equilibrium. Convergence to this equilibrium is
robust to a variety of different initial population
proportions. Note that in this environment, the baseline
sunk-unaware strategy is not even supported. Instead,
the most sunk-aware (i.e., lowest k) strategies have
Fig. 3. Replicator dynamics for the same game as shown in Fig. 2, but with 100 times fewer 20s in the initial population as 18s or 19s.
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that strategies 19 and 20 are dominated.
We have not successfully verified that this is a
unique equilibrium; GAMBIT (which attempts to find
all equilibria) was not able to find a symmetric
equilibrium for this game after days of cpu time (it did
find one asymmetric equilibrium). Amoeba takes
about 15 min to find this equilibrium.
Given that 16 was the most heavily represented
strategy when the game is restricted to the 16–20
range, it is natural to investigate whether lower values
might perform better still. We tested the above game
with a broader but coarser grid of strategies: 0, 8, 12,
16, and 20. We show the evolutionary dynamics in
Fig. 5 based on a payoff matrix estimated by 8 millionFig. 4. Replicator dynamics for strategies 20ka{16,. . .,20} in a
game with uniform preferences but a fixed job length of two. The
evolved Nash equilibrium is (0.745, 0.255, 0, 0).simulations per profile. The evolved Nash equilibrium
is for everyone to play 16. According to GAMBIT,
strategies 0 and 8 are dominated, and everyone
playing 16 is the only Nash equilibrium.
This game stressed two of our solution methods: it
took GAMBIT about a day of runtime to reach its
conclusion. The Amoeba algorithm did not find any
Nash equilibria at all (although it identified a mixed
strategy close to pure strategy 16 as nearly in
equilibrium).
6.3. Exponential job length
Our final variation on the agent preference model
applies exponential preferences. We present theFig. 5. Replicator dynamics for strategies 20ka{0,8,12,16,20} in a
game with uniform preferences but fixed job length of two. The
evolved equilibrium is (0, 0, 0, 1, 0)—i.e., everyone play 16.
Fig. 6. Replicator dynamics for strategies 20ka(16,. . .,20} in a
game with exponential preferences. The evolved equilibrium is (0,
1, 0, 0, 0)—i.e., everyone play 17.
D.M. Reeves et al. / Decision Support Systems 39 (2005) 67–8578evolutionary dynamics for the strategy set 16–20 in
Fig. 6, which is based on a payoff matrix estimated
from 22 million samples per profile. The system
evolves to {0,1,0,0,0} (i.e., everyone play 17), which
is a Nash equilibrium. This equilibrium is robust to
initial population distribution using our evolutionary
method. Amoeba does not find this equilibrium, but
again identifies a nearby mixed strategy as close.
GAMBIT determined that no strategy was dominated
in this game, and was unable to determine whether theFig. 7. Payoff matrix for two-player game with exponential preferequilibrium is unique. From this configuration, the
exponential model yields an observed equilibrium
distribution for k intermediate between the uniform
and constant models.
6.4. Varying number of players
The experiments reported above all employ a five-
player game configuration. We have performed further
trials varying the number of agents (N=2, 8, 10),
maintaining the other game parameters as in our
standard setup, with exponentially distributed job
length (Section 6.3). The objective of this variation
was to exercise the methodology on a range of
settings of game shapes, and to identify any system-
atic relation between N and the equilibria we find.
6.4.1. Two agents
With only two players, we can consider a larger set
of candidate strategies. For this experiment, we
investigated 14 strategies, defined by the set 20
ka{0,3,6,8,10,11,. . .,17,18,20}. This yields 105 pro-
files, for each of which we simulated 1.2 million
games to construct the payoff matrix, depicted in Fig.
7. Our replicator dynamics (shown in Fig. 8) finds theences and with strategies 20ka{0,3,6,8,10,11,. . .,17,18,20}.
Fig. 8. Replicator dynamics for two-player game with exponential preferences with strategies 20ka{0,3,6,8,10,11,. . .,17,18,20}.
6 In fact, the sample mean follows a t-distribution with n1
degrees of freedom where n is the sample size. With our sample
sizes in the millions, the t-distribution is indistinguishable from the
normal distribution. In other words, we can safely use the Centra
Limit Theorem’s normal approximation.
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GAMBIT identifies this as one of three equilibria
(all symmetric) for this payoff matrix. All playing 14
is also Nash, as is the mixed strategy of playing 14
with probability 0.514 and 15 otherwise. Only
strategies 14, 15, and 16 survive iterated elimination
of dominated strategies. We see in Fig. 8 that these are
indeed the three most tenacious strategies under our
replication process.
6.4.2. Eight and ten agents
With more than a handful of agents, it is not
generally feasible to create a payoff matrix with more
than a handful of strategies. Our experiments with
eight- and ten-player games employ a pool of four
strategies: 20ka{10,14,17,20}. This yields 165 pro-
files for the eight-player case, for which we simulated
1.5 million games per profile. For the ten-player case,
there are 286 profiles. We simulated 3.9 million
games per profile, which took many cpu-weeks.
The conclusion for both eight and ten players is the
same: k=1 is a dominant strategy. In both cases, the
replicator dynamics show strategy 20 overwhelming
the population within 40 generations. For the eight-
player case, GAMBIT confirms that 20 is dominant
(and therefore also the unique Nash equilibrium). But
for ten players, the raw payoff matrix (i.e., the normal
form without exploiting symmetry) contains 10 million
payoff values. GAMBIT is not able to use the more
compact symmetric representation, and in our installa-
tion, crashes trying to load this game into memory.6.5. Discussion
In our experiments with exponential preferences,
the equilibrium k value was monotone in the number
of agents, N. This can be explained by observing that
increasing N can ameliorate the exposure problem.
Consider the situation when the prices pass the
threshold at which an agent stops bidding. The
presence of more competing bidders increases the
likelihood that the stopped agent will be let boff the
hookQ for its current winnings by being outbid.
Therefore, it is less compelling for an agent to treat
its current winnings as a sunk cost. In other words, k
should be closer to 1 the more agents there are, which
is what we find here.7. Sensitivity analysis: robustness to sampling noise
As discussed in Section 5.1, the payoff matrices
used in deriving the above results are estimates based
on sampling. An important question is whether the
equilibria we find are robust or would they change
with further sampling? By the Central Limit Theorem,
the mean of a sample from any distribution approx-
imates a normal distribution, given enough samples.6l
Fig. 10. Sensitivity analysis for five-player game with uniform
preferences but a fixed job length of two and strategies
20ka{0,8,12,16,20}. Compare to the replicator dynamics for the
maximum likelihood payoff matrix for this game in Fig. 5.
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of the expected payoffs in the payoff matrix. By
sampling from these distributions independently, we
can generate a new, variant payoff matrix. If many
such variant payoff matrices yield the same equili-
brium results, then we can conclude that we are
insensitive to sampling noise. We expect this to be a
conservative measure of sensitivity because it treats
the errors in the expected payoffs as independent. So
to the extent that the errors are correlated, we expect
this measure will overestimate our sensitivity to
sampling noise. We have in fact observed informally
that our sensitivity analysis tends to report wider
variances in equilibria than there turns out to be after
gathering additional samples.
Several of our results reported above are imper-
vious to sampling noise. This was determined by
performing our equilibrium analysis on several
thousand variants and finding that the equilibrium
never changed. This was the case for the uniform
preferences game reported in Section 6.1 and for the
games with eight and ten players reported in Section
6.4.2. For our other results, we find varying amounts
of sensitivity. Figs. 9–12 illustrate this by showing
cumulative distribution functions for the equilibrium
proportions of each of the strategies. The dotted
vertical lines show the mean proportion for the
corresponding strategy over all the variant payoff
matrices sampled.
For example, we see in Fig. 9 that for the fixed job
length game reported in Section 6.2, the mean
proportion of strategy 16 is identical to the proportionFig. 9. Sensitivity analysis for payoff matrix for five-player game
with uniform preferences but a fixed job length of two and strategies
20ka{16,. . .,20}. Compare to the replicator dynamics for the
maximum likelihood payoff matrix for this game in Fig. 4.found for the maximum likelihood payoff matrix
(using the actual sample means) and it varies
according to a near-perfect normal distribution. We
also see that strategy 18, which died out for the
maximum likelihood payoff matrix, has a 10% chance
of actually holding on to 5% of the population in
equilibrium. Again, note that since this measure is
conservative, the true equilibrium results are actually
more likely to match those reported in Section 6 for
the max-likelihood payoff matrices.
Fig. 12 shows a clear need for more samples before
we can give much credence to the equilibria reported
in Section 6.4.1. However, we have run a smaller two-
player experiment with nine strategies (20ka{0,3,6,8,
10,12,14,17,20}) where 14 was dominant and foundFig. 11. Sensitivity analysis for payoff matrix for five-player game
with exponential preferences and strategies 20ka{16,. . .,20}.
Compare to the replicator dynamics for the max-likelihood payoff
matrix for this game in Fig. 6.
Fig. 12. Sensitivity analysis for two-player game with exponential
preferences and with strategies 20ka{0,3,6,8,10,11,. . .,17,18,20}.
Strategy 15 is the only one with most of its mass significantly above
zero. In Fig. 8, 15 is the only strategy to survive.
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Therefore, the qualitative conclusions about this game
are not seriously suspect. Nonetheless, we ran an
additional 3 million simulations (per profile) and
found some slight changes: strategy 16 no longer
survives iterated elimination of dominated strategies
and the mixed strategy equilibrium is skewed more
towards strategy 14. There was no change in the pure
strategy equilibria. The sensitivity analysis with the
additional games shows greater robustness to sam-
pling error with the additional samples.8. Related work: evolutionary search for trading
strategies
Several prior studies have employed evolutionary
techniques for the analysis or derivation of trading
strategies. An early example was an evolutionary
simulation among trading agents submitted to the
Santa Fe Insitute (SFI) Double Auction Tournament
[33].
The SFI Artificial Stock Market [1] has been used
to investigate theories of trading behavior and market
dynamics, incorporating genetic algorithms (GAs) and
other evolutionary mechanisms in versions of the
model. This work is part of a growing literature in
agent-based finance [18], much of which makes use of
evolutionary techniques.
Price [31] demonstrates the use of genetic algo-
rithms (GAs) for a variety of standard industrial
organization games (e.g., Bertrand and Cournotduopoly). In Price’s approach, the GA serves as an
optimization method, employed to derive a best
response. For instance, his GA model for the duopoly
games comprises populations of strategies for each
producer, each updated separately according to GA
rules. The search is coevolutionary in the sense that
fitness statistics are derived by joint sampling from
the pair of populations.
Cliff [7] applied GAs to evolve improved versions
of his bZIPQ trading strategy for continuous double
auctions. Improvement in his study is defined in terms
of convergence to competitive equilibrium prices, as
opposed to surplus for particular agents. The evolu-
tionary search, therefore, is for a high-performing
homogeneous trading policy, rather than a strategic
equilibrium. In a more recent work, Cliff [8] expanded
the search space to include a market-mechanism
dimension, thus evolving a trading strategy in con-
junction with an auction rule. As above, the GA’s
fitness measure is in terms of aggregate market
performance, rather than individual profit.
Using a coevolutionary approach similar to that of
Price discussed above, Phelps et al. [29] employ
genetic programming to derive strategies for an
electricity trading game studied by Nicolaisen et al.
[27]. They then extend the model to evolve auction
rules in tandem with the trading strategies. Unlike
Cliff, Phelps et al. evaluate fitness of the mechanism
based on aggregate performance, while evolving
trading strategies based on individual performance.
Byde [6] evaluated a parametrized range of auction
mechanisms, essentially equivalent to a one-sided
version of k-double auctions [34]. For each scenario
(auction setting and distribution of private and
common values), he employs the GA to evolve a
trading strategy, and evaluates the average revenue of
the given auction with respect to a population of
traders using that strategy.9. Best response to SB
The foregoing account of our experiments suggests
that our approach does not escape the curse of
dimensionality: we cannot derive an unrestricted
characterization of equilibrium behavior in the full
strategy space. However, we have shown that focused
simulations can reveal restricted equilibria in selected
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this method. An approach toward more general
strategy recommendations would be to relax the
restriction on one agent’s strategy selection, while
maintaining a focusing constraint on the others’. This
would not yield an equilibrium result, of course, but it
might establish a best response strategy to some
environment the agent might face. Since prior
researchers have given this strategy substantial atten-
tion, one natural candidate assumption about the other
agents is that they are straightforward bidders. Thus,
we pose the question: What is the best response to
SB? And in particular, can the best response be
usefully characterized as an SB variant? Unfortu-
nately, it does not appear that this is the case, or that
the best response has any simple form, as indicated by
the following examples. These examples demonstrate
that, at least when an agent has strong priors about the
preferences and strategies of other agents, its optimal
behavior can be very far from bstraightforwardQ.
Example 2. Let N=M=2, with bourQ agent requiring
both slots for its job, which has value 250. Suppose
the other agent (by assumption, a straightforward
bidder) has job length 1, and one of the following
deadline/value profiles, known to our agent:
! (100,98) (i.e., value of 100 for slot 1 or 98 for slot
2), or
! (200,170).
Note that our agent will be profitable in the first
case, but not the second.
If our agent in Example 2 bids straightforwardly, it
will eventually reach a point where the prices reach or
exceed the first of the possible profiles of the other
agent’s values. If prices go past these values, then the
agent must either take a significant loss on one of the
slots and stop bidding, or proceed to pay 370 to outbid
the high profile. [If the other agent has the high
profile, then the prices at the threshold point will be
(100,70), so taking the loss of 70 is preferred to going
all out and losing 120.]
A variant on the straightforward bidding strategy,
SBV, would distinguish the two profiles based on
observed prices long before reaching the threshold of
the low profile. If the second agent has the low profile,
it will never bid the price of slot 1 more than twoabove the price of slot 2, since the gain in surplus
from winning slot 1 is only two. If it has the high
profile, however, it will bid the price for slot 1 as
much as 30 higher than the price for slot 2. Therefore,
if the other agent is actively bidding and the difference
in prices between the two slots exceeds 2, the other
agent must have the higher profile. By recognizing
this and stopping intelligently when the price of the
first slot reaches 4 or greater, our agent playing SBV
would lose only 1 (what it bid for the second slot).
Example 3. Consider a setup identical to that of
Example 2, except that there is a third agent with job
length 1 and job value of 20 for either deadline.
SBVbehaves qualitatively the same in this example,
except that it would lose 21 rather than 1 in case the
second agent has the high profile. The reason is that
the third agent masks the behavior of the second, by
alternately bidding up the prices for each slot (since
their value is the same to this agent). The second
agent’s profile-dependent behavior is reflected in
prices only when the third agent drops out. By then,
SBVhas offered 21 for slot 2.
A bsmarter than straightforward biddingQ strategy
(SSBV) would avoid this loss by actively bidding in a
way to distinguish the cases earlier. Specifically,
suppose SSBV offers 23 for slot 1 right away. The
response of the straightforward second agent will
immediately reveal whether it has a high or low
profile. If high, it will outbid our agent, which can
then drop out without having lost anything. If low, it
can proceed straightforwardly to win a profitable job.
This reasoning also applies to Example 2, where SSBV
would provide a further slight advantage over SBV.
Example 4. Consider a setup identical to that of




For this example, even SSBVcannot distinguish the
two profiles until the difference in slot prices is at least
125, and moreover, in the high-profile case, it has
offered that much for slot 1 when the other agent
reveals itself by bidding for slot 2. It will then be stuck
with that magnitude of loss.
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forwardQ bidder, SSSBV, to realize that what it should
do at this point is outbid the agent on slot 2 (a bid of 4
suffices), causing it to switch back to slot 1. At this
point, our agent stops bidding, and is stuck with the
loss of 4 on slot 2, but this amount is quite small
compared to what it would have lost if it had stopped
with slot 1. Notice that this SSSBV bidder behaves
exactly as a sunk-aware (k=0) SB bidder (see Section
3.2) until the distinguishing information is revealed
about its opponent’s preferences, and then has the
intelligence to drop out (long before an SB bidder
would stop).
Examples 2–4 clearly illustrate the point that even
relatively simple (two-slot) scenarios with one or two
straightforward bidders can call for rather sophisti-
cated bidding strategies in response. In fact, it is easy
to construct scenarios where small distinctions about
time slots in which our agent has no interest (i.e., past
its latest deadline) resolve critical uncertainty with
respect to the slots we do care about. Thus, we tend to
be skeptical that any simple strategy form will capture
general situations where information revelation is
pivotal.
One might object that the foregoing examples,
despite their simplicity, are unrepresentative of realistic
environments precisely because of the way that price
patterns reveal sharp distinctions among valuation
levels. For example, the distributions of deadlines and
their values assumed in the experiments of Section 6
do not have this property. One potentially fruitful
avenue for future work would be to characterize
problem classes based on bdiffuseQ distributions where
information revelation is not a driving factor. It may
well be that variants of SB are reasonable responses to
SB in some natural scheduling environments.10. Conclusion
The foregoing study illustrates the difficulty of
drawing conclusions about strategy choices in even a
relatively simple simultaneous ascending auction
game. Straightforward bidding is not even approx-
imately optimal, nor are straightforward variants of
same, even in response to other straightforward
bidders. The space of strategies is too large for
analytic methods to be directly fruitful, and exhaustivesimulation studies are out of the question. Analysis
and simulation can produce results for restricted
versions of the game; however, restrictions on the
strategy choices available are inherently somewhat
arbitrary, and results remain sensitive to particular
distributions of agent preferences.
Some may interpret this pessimistic assessment as
further argument that a simultaneous auction design in
the presence of complementarities is untenable, and
propose that combinatorial or other mechanisms of
broader scope be imposed in their stead. We agree that
more coordinated market designs have advantages,
and advocate use of combinatorial auctions or even
direct mechanisms where possible.
Nevertheless, we observe that separation of related
markets is a prevalent situation today, and expect that
it will always be so, since coordinating the allocation
of all significantly related resources in the world
through a single mechanism is simply infeasible.
Thus, despite its difficulty, strategic analysis of games,
such as that studied here, is a necessary task for those
interested in market-based resource allocation.
Although we are still far from achieving a
comprehensive understanding of the market schedul-
ing game, we are hopeful that the techniques
developed here will prove useful tools. Specifically,
through parameterization of a strategy space, sam-
pling-based simulation, and evolutionary search, it is
possible to explore systematically the strategic issues
salient to the simultaneous auction setup, as well as a
variety of similar market games.Acknowledgments
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